It has been claimed that concepts in different semantic domains vary in the extent to which their meaning is comprised of different kinds of semantic information. Discussion has mainly focused around two kinds of concepts-living things and man-made objects-arguing that functional information is central to the meaning of artefacts whereas perceptual information is more important for the meaning of living things. This distinction has been important in accounting for patterns of semantic impairments following brain injury (Warrington & Shallice, 1984) .
INTRODUCTION
living/non-living distinction was actually a perceptual/functional distinction; perceptual properties were more salientin the semantic representations of living things, whereas functional information was more important in the meaning representations of nonliving things. When brain damage selectively impaired perceptual properties, this affected living things more than non-living; preservation of functional information benefited non-living more than living things. On both accounts (living/non-living; perceptual/functional), the consequence is the same: Patients retain broad category information for living things but lose the fine-grained details that permit distinctions between exemplars. This results in within-category errors, a pattern that has frequently been observed (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . When brain damage results in category-specific impairments 2 , the semantic representations of non-living things are relatively spared, because they are defined more in terms of their functional properties and these seem to be less affected by brain damage. In contrast, damage usually affects living things, even when familiarity is controlled for (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Farah, McMullen, & Meyer, 1991; Laiacona, Barbarotto, & Capitani, 1993; Sartori, Miozzo, & Job, 1993) . In such cases, the patient appears to have little knowledge of the perceptual attributes of living things, in contrast to relatively preserved functional information (but see Laiacona et al., 1993) . Hart and Gordon (1992) for example, reported a patient with a selective naming deficit for animals. The patient retained knowledge of the functional properties of animals, but had impaired knowledge of their perceptual attributes. On the face of it, this suggests that there may be something special about the functional information that underpins semantic representations, such that it tends to be preserved when brain damage results in category specific impairments.
The idea that functional information may be especially salient in semantic representations is supported by recent research into the acquisition of concepts. Early accounts of the acquisition of word meanings claimed that first meanings are based upon a small set of perceptual features, such as size and shape, derived from innate perceptual categories (Clark, 1973) . However, it has been argued (e.g. Mandler, 1992; Nelson, 1974) that semantic feature theory is inadequate as an account of how children develop word meanings. Mandler claims that conceptual development is based on functional information in the form of "image schemas." In a number of experiments, she found that infants as young as 7 months could distinguish between animals and vehicles, which, Mandler argues, is due to the development of "image schemas," such as "path," which represent the ways in which things move through space. The contrast that children are learning is between self-motion and induced motion. This is not a 2 Funnell and Sheridan (1992) have pointed out that some patients who appear to have category-specific deficits do not have them when familiarity is controlled for, but see Bunn, Tyler & Moss (1997) .
FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES
perceptual distinction; it is based on functional information about the way in which objects interact with their environment. It is this type of information that provides the beginning concept of animal as distinct from non-animal. Asimilar proposal has been made by Nelson (1974) who has argued that the acquisition of the core meaning of concepts is based on functional information.
The idea that functional information is important in the development of conceptual categories is not just a claim about the earliest stages of learning. Research by Keil (1994) suggests that pre-schoolers developquite sophisticated theories that underly their understanding of concepts. This is the "concepts-astheories" approach to the acquisition of concepts. Keil (1994) claims that young children understand the functional/adaptive explanations associated with plants and animals and realise that these are different from the sorts of functional accounts relevant to artefacts. Similarly, Carey's (1985) research has shown that young children have well-developed theories of biological kinds. These cannot be developed just on the basis of sensory properties-what things look, taste, and smell like; they crucially involve how biological kinds function in the world (e.g. how they breathe or reproduce).
This approach to the development of concepts reinforces the claim for the importance of functional information we made earlier on the basis of the category-specific deficits. Functional information seems to be an early determinant of word meaning and the later construction of conceptual theories. Where the developmental and neuropsychological accounts seem to differ is in the importance of functional information in the meaning representations of living things, with neuropsychologists minimising the contribution of functional information to the meaning of living things, and developmentalists like Keil and Carey stressing it. These contrasting positions may turn out to be due largely to the different ways in which the term "functional" is used. In developmental research, "functional information," when applied to living things, means biological function; breathing, reproduction, vision, movement. Neuropsychologists typically focus on non-biological functional information, such as where an animal lives. Patients are asked questions, probing functional/associative knowledge, such as: "Does this animal live in the forest, jungle, desert, open plains, or somewhere else?"; "Does this animal eat meat, vegetation, meat and vegetation, or something else?" (from Laws, Evans, Hodges, & McCarthy, 1995) ; "Which is considered to be quite an intelligentanimal-a gorilla or a pig?" (from Powell & Davidoff, 1995) . Functional information of this type is very different from biological function, and this difference may have important consequences, some of which we discuss later.
The developmental account suggests that functional information may have special salience in semantic representations, as does the fact that it seems to be relatively robust in the face of brain damage. In the first section of the paper we explore the processing implications of the hypothesis that functional information is a particularly salient aspect of a word's meaning. We predict that it should be activated robustly and early in the processing of a word, and our first set of studies supports this view. A second prediction is that functional information should be relatively preserved following brain damage. As we mentioned earlier, the general picture emerging from studies of semantic impairments tends to support this view; the semantic representations of nonliving things are usually less impaired than living things and, even when patients show living thing deficits, the functional properties of living things tend to be preserved. However, many of these studies rely heavily upon tasks such as confrontation naming and probe questioning, which tend to overestimate the severity of a patient's deficit (see Tyler, 1992) . Patients may have serious difficulty in naming pictures and yet retain considerable semantic knowledge. We have found that a sensitive measure of semantic memory is provided by implicit tasks, like semantic priming . Patients often show normal semantic priming effects even when their semantic memory, as measured by other tasks such as naming, word-to-picture matching, and definitions, is severely impaired (Moss, Tyler, Hodges, & Patterson, 1995) . For these reasons, we test the claim for the preservation of functional information following brain damage by means of semantic priming tasks. Data from several patients who show preserved functional information are presented in the second section of the paper.
In the third section we explore some further implications of the role of functional properties in semantic representations. In particular, we consider distinctions between different types of functional information, especially in the representation of living things. In discussing these issues we focus on the developmental claim that biological functional information, such as the fact that animals breathe, move, and eat, is especially salient in the semantic representations of living things. One hypothesis we might draw from such a claim is that this type of functional information might be preserved following brain damage, even when other types of functional information (where an animal lives, what iteats) are impaired. We discuss this issue in detail and report data from a patient whose semantic impairment following herpes encephalitis infection supports this prediction.
PRIMING OF FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION
The claim that functional properties have a special significance in semantic representations, especially of man-made objects, suggests that functional information should be activated at least as strongly as other types of semantic information and might even be activated more rapidly, on the assumption that salient aspects of meaning need to be made available to the language system as rapidly as possible for integration with the existing context. We evaluated these hypotheses by means of the semantic priming paradigm; a task that enables us to examine the automatic activation of different kinds of semantic information. The rationale behind the semantic priming task is that if semantic information is automatically accessed, it will result in significant levels of priming (cf. Collins & Quillian, 1969; . We predicted that (1) functional information should prime just as effectively as other types of semantic information, since it should be just as easily activated, and (2) functional information may prime earlier than other types of semantic information. We consider the evidence for each of these hypotheses in turn.
Does Functional Information Prime as Well as Other Types of Semantic Information?

Experiment 1
In this initial experiment, we compared priming for functional attributes of living and non-living things with another type of semantic property-perceptual attributes-and contrasted these with two types of semantic relation: superordinates and category co-ordinates. Assuming that semantic representations are comprised of a set of microfeatures in a distributed system, superordinates and category co-ordinates should prime robustly because of their extensive featural overlap (Masson, 1995) . If functional properties are particularly salient, as we have been arguing, then functionally related targets should also be primed robustly. We included perceptual features in order to be able to evaluate claims for the differential importance of perceptual and functional information in the semantic representations of living and non-living things. On the Warrington and Shallice (1984) account, where perceptual attributes are more important than functional properties for living things, we might expect to see more perceptual priming for living than non-living things and the opposite pattern for functional attributes.
Method: Stimuli. We selected 120 potential prime words (52 living and 68 non-living) from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set and entered them into a property generation pre-test to find potential perceptual and functional properties for each word. The items were divided into two 60-item lists, each presented to 45 members of the Centre for Speech and Language subject pool. Subjects were asked to list the properties that "most people would generally attribute to the object or thing." Results of the pre-test provided a production frequency for each property of each stimulus word, defined as the percentage of subjects who listed a given property for a given word. We chose properties with a high production frequency, on the assumption that they provide an indication of the centrality or salience of that property (cf. Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988) . We matched the production frequency (and therefore salience) of the properties across the four conditions (living perceptual, living functional, non-living perceptual, non-living functional; see Table 1 ).
On the basis of the property generation pre-test, we selected 24 living and 24 non-living prime words, matched for familiarity and mean production frequency of the property in the perceptual and functional conditions. We selected properties that were expressable in one word, to be used as targets for lexical decision. The functional properties included, where animals live (monkey-tree; crocodile-river) and what vegetables are used for (onion-cook; cherry-eat). The perceptual attributes included colour, texture, shape, and size. Our final constraint was that the prime-target pairs should not be strong associates. On some accounts, associative priming is based on co-occurrence links between words at the level of lexical form representation and does not reflect semantic relatedness (Moss, Hare, Day, & Tyler, 1994) . Since we were interested in semantic, and not associative, priming, all the prime-target pairs had an association strength (Moss & Older, 1996; Postman & Keppel, 1970) of less than 15% in forward and backwards directions. Moss and Older (1996) association norms. c A mixture of the MRC Psycholinguistic database and pre-tests in our laboratory. d Hofland and Johanssen (1982) .
Priming in the two property conditions was compared with the two kinds of prime-target category relation: superordinate (e.g. crocodile-animal) and coordinate (e.g. crocodile-elephant). In all four prime-target conditions, the familiarity and length of the targets were closely matched over the living and non-living items.
A further pre-test established that the prime-target pairs in each condition were related, and that the degree of semantic relatedness was similar for both the living and non-living sets of items. In this pre-test we included 144 prime-targetpairs, rotated over three different lists to avoid repetition of primes, and filler pairs that were either close synonyms or semantically unrelated. Each list was presented to 15 subjects who rated each pair on a scale of 1 (very unrelated in meaning) to 9 (very related). The mean rating was 8.06 for synonyms and 1.70 for unrelated pairs, indicating that subjects were using the rating scale correctly. The mean rating for the co-ordinate pairs was 6.09 for non-living and 5.95 for living things, for perceptual properties it was 4.95 for non-living and 4.81 for living things, and for functional attributes it was 5.61 for non-living and 5.28 for living things.
Each prime word was paired with each of its four targets (e.g. crocodile: animal, elephant, green, river). Reaction times in these semantically related conditions were compared to responses to the same targets when they were preceded by an unrelated control word. Control words were matched to prime words on familiarity and length. The control word came from the same broad semantic domain as the prime word (i.e. living or non-living) but from a different category. For each prime-target type, the related and unrelated pairs were rotated over two different versions of the materials, producing an eightversion experiment. To reduce the number of testing sessions to a more manageable four, we combined half the perceptual properties with half the co-ordinate properties to form two versions and combined half the superordinate and half the functional properties to form two versions. Each related and unrelated prime only occurred once per version.
There were 48 related test word pairs and 48 unrelated test word pairs per version, with another 48 unrelated filler pairs, reducing the proportion of semantically related real words to 33% 3 , or 16.5% of the total set. We added 144 word/nonword pairs (e.g. morning-hiction, tulip-blane) to produce an equal number of real words and nonwords. A set of 41 practice items preceded each test list.
Procedure. The materials were recorded onto DAT tape by a female native speaker of British English, then digitised at a sampling rate of 20kHz. During the experiment, the words were played out from computer disk under the control of the DMASTR experimental package. The words were played out over headphones with a 200msec ISI. Subjects heard each prime-target pair and made a yes/no lexical decision to the target. LD latencies were measured from the onset of the target word.
Subjects. We tested 53 subjects (aged between 18-30 years) from the Centre for Speech and Language subject pool. They were rotated across all four versions of the experiment in such a way that no subject encountered the same target more than once.
Results. Subjects made an average of 2% LD errors, which were removed from the analyses. The mean RTs were inversely transformed to increase statistical power without introducing truncation biases (Ratcliff, 1993; Ulrich & Miller, 1994) . The transformed data were entered into two ANOVAs with prime type (related/unrelated), list (1,2), semantic relation (superordinate, co-ordinate, perceptual, and functional) and subtype (natural/artefact). The mean priming effects are shown in Fig. 1 . There was an overall priming effect [F1(1,98) = 156.9, P < .001; F2(1,176) = 88.01, P < .001] with test RTs being faster (689msec) than control RTs (733msec). The amount of priming did not vary as a function of type of semantic relation [F1(3,98) = 2.45, P = .0672; F2(3,176) = 1.36, P = .25]; priming varied between 35-60msec. The degree to which priming was similar in the various conditions can be seen in Fig. 1 . Finally, amount of priming was not significantly affected by the living/non-living variable (F1 and F2 < 1); there was an average of 45msec priming for the non-living things and 43msec for the living things. More importantly, priming for the different semantic relations was not affected by the living/non-living variable [F1 < 1; F2(3,176) = 1.323, P = .266]; in the superordinate condition, there was 38msec priming for the living things and 32msec for the non-living, and for category co-ordinates the priming effects were also very similar-60msec for living things and 61msec for non-living. Perceptual properties showed the largest differential, with a 20msec priming effect for living things and 53msec priming for non-living; however, this difference was not significant when the perceptual properties were analysed independently [F(1,40) = 1.243, P = .27]. The mean priming effect for the functional attributes of living things was 55msec and 36msec for non-living; this difference was not significant [F(1,40) = 1.522, P = .224].
Discussion. The purpose of this experiment was to compare priming of functional attributes with other types of prime-target relation to determine whether functional properties prime robustly. Our data clearly establish that the FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES functional properties of non-living things (e.g. sweater-warm; fork-eat) are significantly primed. This is what would be predicted on any account that stresses the importance of functional properties in the semantic representations of non-living things. More surprisingly, perhaps, for accounts emphasising the marginality of functional properties in the semantic representations of living things, these also primed significantly. Indeed, there was no significant difference in the amount of functional priming for living and non-living things, suggesting that functional attributes can be highly salient in the semantic representations of both living things and man-made objects.
We also found significant priming for perceptual attributes of living (e.g. swan-white; pumpkin-round) and non-living things (e.g. bike-pedals; axe-handle) with no quantitative difference between them. The fact that living and non-living concepts generate similar amounts of perceptual and functional priming suggests that both types of properties are automatically and rapidly activated when a prime is heard. This, in turn, implies that both properties are important in the representation of living and non-living things.
Finally, property relations prime just as strongly as do taxonomic category relations, a surprising outcome on many models of semantic memory. Distributed models of semantic representations would predict that category 
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co-ordinates and superordinates would prime strongly because they share large numbers of semantic features and therefore their patterns of activation overlap to a greater extent (Masson, 1995) . This cannot be the reason for strong functional and perceptual priming, because the prime and target share few semantic features. The source of strong property priming may be the rapid activation of this type of semantic information. Although the prime word activates all of the semantic features with which it is associated, the activation rise-time of each feature may be a function of its saliency within the representation. Single features that are especially salient will be rapidly activated and thus will prime the related property target that occurs immediately after the prime. The perceptual and functional features used in the study were especially salient in the representation, as we know from their ratings in the property generation pre-test.
Other priming studies we have carried out support this general picture of strong functional priming. One set of studies (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & MarslenWilson, 1995) focused on artefacts, comparing priming for category co-ordinates (e.g. table-chair) and functional properties (e.g. broom-floor), and using two different auditory lexical decision tasks: paired and single-word presentation. The paired presentation lexical decision task involves subjects hearing pairs of words and making a lexical decision response to the second member of the pair. In the single-word variant, they hear a list of words and make a lexical decision to each word. We used the paired and single-word presentation methods in order to evaluate recent claims that semantic priming is strategic and does not show up in tasks that tap into the automatic activation of semantic information, like the single-word presentation task (see Shelton & Martin, 1992) . In both tasks we found robust priming for both category co-ordinates and functional relations, and no difference between them in the amount of priming. When we used a visual single-word lexical decision task, we found significant semantic priming only for functional relations (see Moss, Ostrin, et al., 1995, for details) . In another study, we used the same materials in a primed monitoring task. In this version of the priming paradigm, subjects hear lists of words and press a response key when they hear a pre-specified target word. The target word follows either an unrelated control word or a prime word. Once again, we found similar priming for both functional attributes and category coordinates .
Is Functional Information Activated Early?
Experiment 2
We have established that the functional properties of living and non-living things are strongly primed, and have argued that this may be due to the rapid activation of properties that are particularly salient in the semantic representation. We now test this hypothesis more directly by asking whether functional information is activated early in the processing of a word. As a word is being heard, and its semantic features activated, are functional features activated most rapidly? We ask this question with respect to non-living things since all theories agree that functional properties are especially salient in their representation. If functional information is a particularly salient aspect of the meaning of non-living things it should be activated rapidly in order to be integrated into the developing sentential representation. We test this hypothesis by presenting probe targets as the spoken prime is being heard. In our previous study, the targets were presented at the offset of the prime; in the present study, we present targets at two points, after only a part of the prime has been heard, and at offset. In this way we can probe for early activation of perceptual and functional properties.
Although many studies have shown that semantic information is activated rapidly, and well before all of a word has been heard (Marslen-Wilson, 1987; Zwitserlood, 1989; Zwitserlood & Schriefers, 1995) , few have explored the possibility of differential rates of activation for different kinds of semantic information. Among those that have, Schreuder, Flores d'Arcais, and Glazenborg (1984) , and Flores d'Arcais, Schreuder, and Glazenborg (1985) used visual naming and lexical decision tasks to compare priming for perceptual (e.g. cherry-ball; which share the property of roundness) and "conceptual" relations. Only prime-target pairs that shared perceptual properties produced priming in the naming task, whereas in lexical decision there was priming for conceptually related pairs and reduced perceptual priming. Since naming is assumed to tap into earlier phases of activation than lexical decision, this pattern was taken as evidence that perceptual properties are activated earlier than conceptual properties. Although these studies illustrate the differential availability of various types of semantic information, they do not directly address the issue of the relative time-course of the activation of perceptual and functional information 4 , because the conceptual properties (e.g. cherry-banana) were all category co-ordinates, although they were described as being functional (Moss & Gaskell, in press) .
Our assumptions about the salience of functional information predict that it should be activated just as rapidly, if not more so, than perceptual information. To test this hypothesis we probed the timing with which functional and perceptual properties are activated when a word referring to a man-made object is heard (Moss, McCormick, & Tyler, 1997) . We presented subjects with primes, which were either short fragments or the entire duration of the word, followed by target words for lexical decision. The fragments corresponded to the duration of the word up to its Isolation Point (Grosjean, 1980; Tyler & Wessels, 1983) . It is now well known that listeners recognise most words well before their offset (Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980; Zwitserlood, 1989) and that a Recognition Point (RP) can be identified for each word. The Isolation Point (IP) occurs shortly before RP and provides an objective measure of the amount of sensory input the listener needs to hear to start to identify the word-although at this point they may not be wholly confident because there may be other candidates still active. The IP is established operationally by means of the gating task (Grosjean, 1980; Tyler & Wessels, 1983) in which subjects hear successively larger fragments of a word and write down, after each fragment, the word they think they're hearing. The point at which they first identify the word (although not necessarily with any degree of confidence) is defined as its IP. We compared priming for prime-target pairs in which (1) the target was a perceptual property of the prime (e.g. aeroplane-wing; crown-gold) and (2) the target was a functional property of the prime (e.g. aeroplane-fly; satchel-school). Targets were presented either at the Isolation Point of the prime to probe for early activation before the word could be fully recognised, or at its acoustic offset.
Method: Stimuli. We selected 100 English nouns of 1-2 syllables (all of which referred to man-made objects) as primes. We then carried out a property generation pre-test in which 45 subjects from the Centre for Speech and Language subject pool were presented with booklets containing the prime words and asked to list all of the properties that most people would know about the referents of the words. For the priming study, we selected perceptual and functional properties that were given by at least 10 subjects and could be expressed in a single word. We chose 52 primes with a functional property and 52 with a perceptual property. Half of the primes in each group had suitable functional and perceptual properties (e.g. tractor-farm; tractor-wheel) and so were included in both property conditions, whereas the other 26 primes could only be paired with one type of property that met all of the constraints on property selection; these only appeared in one of the two conditions. The targets in the two property conditions were matched for length and frequency.
Functional properties included typical uses of the prime (e.g. blouse-wear), where the prime was designed to be used (e.g. satchel-school), and adjectival descriptions of the prime's function (e.g. glove-warm). Perceptual properties included visible parts (e.g. aeroplane-wing; blouse-button), colours (e.g. aspirin-white), and shapes (e.g. canoe-narrow). The primes and targets in each condition were matched on prime frequency, target frequency, production frequency of the property, and the duration of the prime. These details are given in Table 2 . Although we have established that associative priming is not a major factor in cross-modal priming (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1992), we made sure that most of the pairs were not normatively associated.
Targets were presented for lexical decision at two positions: Isolation Point and offset of the prime. We carried out a gating pre-test (Grosjean, 1980; Tyler & Wessels, 1983) to establish the location of the Isolation Point. Each prime word was recorded and digitised and played out over headphones in fragments of increasing duration. The first fragment was 100msec, with subsequent fragments increasing by 50msec until the end of the word. After each fragment 15 subjects noted which word they thought they were hearing, together with a confidence rating using a 1 (pure guess) to 10 (completely sure) scale. The IP was calculated as the mean gate at which subjects first identified the word correctly and did not subsequently change their minds, regardless of their confidence ratings. This was converted into duration in msec from the onset of the prime, and determined the point at which the visual target was displayed in the early position. The mean duration of primes to IP was 331msec.
Because of the partial overlap of primes in the two property conditions, each combination of target type and target position was run as one of four separate sub-experiments with different groups of subjects. In each sub-experiment, materials were rotated over two counterbalanced experimental lists so that targets were paired with the prime in one list and the control word in the other.
For each experiment there were 52 test trials; half related and half unrelated. We added 182 unrelated word-word fillers and 208 word-nonword fillers to give a relatedness proportion of 12.5% of real words (6.25% of all trials) and a word-nonword ratio of 50%. Fillers were the same for all four experiments; filler targets were presented either at offset or at 200msec, 300msec or 400msec from prime onset. There were 40 practice items.
Procedure. Materials were recorded onto DAT tape by a female native speaker of British English, and were digitised onto computer hard disk at a sampling rate of 20kHz. On each trial, the prime was played out over headphones, either to offset or to the IP of the word. The cut-off point was always placed at a zero crossing to avoid distortions. Immediately at the offset of the auditory stimulus, a visual target was displayed in upper case in the centre of a Frequency data taken from Hofland and Johanssen (1982) .
the computer screen for 54msec 5 . Subjects were asked to make a yes/no lexical decision as rapidly as possible.
Subjects. We tested 121 subjects from the Centre for Speech and Language subject pool who were paid for their participation.
Results and Discussion. In each experiment 3-6 subjects were removed from the analysis because of slow and variable RTs, leaving between 24 and 29 subjects in each study. Mean lexical decision errors ranged from 1.6-3.6% of the data; they were removed from each data set. Between 1 and 3 outliers (mean + /-2SDs) were removed from the analysis for each sub-experiment. The mean RTs in each experiment were inversely transformed and entered into two ANOVAs with prime type (related/unrelated) and list (1,2). The mean RTs for all four sub-experiments are given in Table 3 .
Functional properties primed at both IP and offset. At IP, there was an 11msec priming effect [F1(1,27) = 7.54, P < .01; F2(1,44) = 6.18, P < .02] and at offset there was a 14msec effect [F1(1,25) = 18.7, P < .001; F2(1,44) = 11.3, P < .005]. The pattern was different for perceptual properties; these only primed at offset. The difference of -1msec between RTs in the related and unrelated conditions at IP was not significant (F1 and F2 < 1), but the 9msec difference at offset was [F1(1,22) = 10.23, P < .01; F2(1,44) = 3.67, P = .06].
The data present a clear picture of early activation of functional information evident at IP, with somewhat delayed activation of perceptual properties 6 . This is consistent with our claims for the saliency of functional information, at least for the meanings of words referring to man-made objects. If functional properties form the core meaning of artefacts (e.g. Keil, 1989) , then they will invariably be activated when a word is encountered. Assuming a distributed model of semantic representations in which frequent mappings strengthen connections, the mapping from the input onto highly salient semantic features should be rapid because the connections should be stronger. The studies we have just described show that when a word is heard, whether it refers to a living or non-living thing, functional properties of its semantic representation are rapidly and strongly activated. We believethat this is because functional properties form part of the core meaning of many concepts. It follows 5 We chose a duration comparableto the 50msec used in related studies (by Zwitserlood (1989) and Zwitserlood and Schriefers (1995) .) 6 One potential confound in our materials is that functional property targets were generally of higher frequency than perceptual targets. This cannot account for our present results for two reasons. First, some earlier research has shown that lower frequency targets tend to produce more, rather than less, priming than high frequency targets (e.g. Becker, 1979) , which would predict the opposite pattern to the results we have obtained. Second, we found no correlation between target frequency and amount of priming for any conditions (P > .1 in all cases).
FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES
from this that functional information should be resistant to the effects of generalised brain damage (as opposed to selective damage to particular semantic features). This is because the concept of a core meaning carries with it the notion of intercorrelations (Keil, 1989; Malt & Smith, 1984) . Those features that form the core meaning of a word are inter-related and form a coherent package that is always activated when that word is encountered. Generalised brain damage might well disrupt some of the features contributing to the core meaning, but the strong intercorrelations between features will mean that remaining features can readily compensate for any damage. This predicts that functional properties should be relatively preserved following brain damage (see Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, in press; Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, Levy, Voice, & Moss, 1996) .
PRESERVATION OF FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION FOLLOWING BRAIN DAMAGE Priming Studies with Patients
If functional features are especially robust in the face of brain damage, we expect to find preservation of functional information for both living and non-living things relative to other kinds of semantic information. The evidence we report here in support of this hypothesis comes from semantic priming studies with brain-damaged patients. We use the semantic priming task with patients as a way of tapping into the representation and automatic activation of semantic information. Although there is a considerable amount of published research on patients with semantic deficits, few studies have used implicit tasks-like semantic priming-that tap more directly into the automatic, obligatory processes involved in language comprehension, even though such tasks are often more sensitive in revealing preserved knowledge (cf. 7 . Studies of semantic impairments typically employ confrontation naming tasks, sometimes supplemented by sorting and picture-pointing. Since many patients often have severe naming problems, this task is not always a sensitive measure of the extent to which semantic information is preserved. In the remainder of this paper, we report semantic priming data from four brain-damaged patients, each suffering from progressive aphasia.
Patient PP
Our first indication that functional information was relatively preserved in patients with severe semantic impairments came from PP, a progressive aphasic patient, suffering from semantic dementia . This is a form of progressive fluent aphasia in which semantics is impaired whereas other aspects of language (syntax and phonology) and cognition are relatively preserved (Snowden, Goulding, & Neary, 1989; Mesulam & Weintraub, 1982; Hodges & Patterson, 1996) . PP's cognitive abilities were relatively intact (Hodges et al., 1992; , but she had a profound impairmentof semantic memory, evidencedby her exceptionally poor performance on a variety of tests designed to assess semantic knowledge via different input and output modalities. For example, she was unable to generate category exemplars, name pictures, or match a picture to a spoken word (Hodges, Patterson, & Tyler, 1994) . It was difficult to hold a conversation with her since she seemed to have no knowledge of the meanings of many familiar words. When asked, for example, what her favourite food was, she replied " . . . food, food, I wish I knew what that was . . . ." CT and MRI scans revealed a moderate degree of cerebral atrophy, mostly in the left hemisphere and around the sylvian fissure. A PET scan performed at the Hammersmith Hospital showed hypometabolism in the left inferior frontal and tempero-parietal regions (Hodges et al., 1992) .
To investigate her semantic deficit, we combined standard off-line tasks (word-picture matching, sorting) with various on-line tasks, designed to tap into the automatic activation of semantic information. This turned out to be particularly appropriate because, as her deterioration progressed, she remained able to participate in on-line tasks long after she was unable to carry out off-line tasks. To determine whether PP's semantic impairments reflected problems with the automatic access of semantic information, we used a semantic priming task, where the prime-target pairs were members of the same category (e.g. 7 We can distinguish between implicit tasks, which probe the nature of underlying representations and their automatic access, and explicit tasks. Explicit tasks inform us about the nature of the final representation, which is the product of implicit processes, and about a listener's ability to operate upon that representation.
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cat-dog; spade-rake) or were members of different categories but were related functionally (e.g. shampoo-hair; broom-floor). Although normal control subjects showed priming for both types of semantic relation, only functionally related pairs primed for PP 8 . She produced robust functional priming at a time when she was at chance on all other standard off-line tasks, such as wordpicture matching and confrontation naming. Remarkably, in the face of her profound semantic impairment, functional aspects of meaning were preserved and, although they could not be accessed using traditional tasks that require controlled access to semantic knowledge, they could be activated automatically by means of an implicit priming task (see Moss, Tyler, et al., 1995, for details) . A particularly interesting aspect of this finding was that, at the time we carried out the priming study, PP was able to carry out many daily activities; for example, she was able to dress and groom herself and eat a meal with the appropriate utensils. Thus, the automatic activation of functional information was consistent with her relatively preserved ability to use familiar objects appropriately in everyday life.
This pattern is not unique to PP; other researchers have also observed that semantic dementia patients are often able to use familiar objects correctly even though they cannot explicitly retrieve any information about them (Saffran & Schwartz, 1994; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1994) . Saffran and Schwartz's semantic dementia patient, WLP, showed a similar pattern to PP. Although her semantic memory was severely impaired, WLP showed a striking preservation of functional information; when presented with a picture of an object, she managed to indicate how it would be used. Similarly, semantic dementia patient KE, discussed by Snowden et al. (1994) , was significantly more likely to identify an object when it appeared in its appropriate context of use. KE could correctly identify a coathanger when it was hanging in a wardrobe, but not when it was placed in a bath. Snowden et al. (1994) argue that when an object appeared in an appropriate context, KE could infer its function from the context and thus identify it. But when the object's use could not be inferred from the context (as with the coathanger in the bath), KE was unable to identify it correctly.
The finding that functional information was relatively preserved in PP compared to other aspects of semantic knowledge prompted us to probe for evidence of the same pattern in other progressive aphasic patients, using an experiment designed specifically to examine the automatic access of different types of semantic information. Accordingly, we tested two progressive patients on the semantic priming task described in Experiment 1, where we compared priming for the functional attributes of living and non-living things with three other types of semantic information-perceptual properties, category co-ordinate and superordinate relations.
Patients AM and SC
General Details. Of our two progressive aphasics, AM, like PP, has fluent speech output and suffers from semantic dementia, and SC' s speech is fluent with word-finding difficulties.
AM, born in 1930, is a retired chemical engineer who presented in April 1994 9 , with a 5-8 yearhistory of difficulty in remembering the names of people, places, and things. Data reported in Hodges and Patterson (1996) showed that, on initial assessment, he scored within the normal range on various tests of visuospatial abilities (the Rey Complex Figure Test [CFT; Rey, 1941] , Judgement of Line Orientation Test [Benton et al., 1983] , and the Object Matching Test [Humphreys & Riddoch, 1984] ). Digit span (WMS-R; Wechsler, 1987) was also normal. In contrast, he was significantly impaired on the Semantic Test Battery of Hodges et al. (1992) , which includes naming, word-picture matching, and sorting tasks using the same set of 48 items. AM performed poorly on all tasks, but was especially impaired on the naming test. His poor performance on tests of semantic knowledge became progressively worse over time. A coronal MRI scan (Hodges & Patterson, 1996) showed selective atrophy of the temporal lobes (with the left more affected than the right), primarily involving the infero-lateral gyri.
SC, who was born in 1925, was referred in January 1992 complaining of the same problems as AM. Upon initial testing her spontaneous speech was fluent with mild word-finding problems. Her visuospatial abilities were wellpreserved at that time and remained so over a 3-year period, as did tests of semantic knowledge that did not require a verbal output. In contrast, her anomia deteriorated markedly. SPECT and MRI scans showed left temporal lobe hypoperfusion and atrophy, respectively (Hodges & Patterson, 1996) .
Priming of Functional Information. We tested both patients on the priming study described in Experiment 1. However, the task demands had to be modified for the patients. AM and SC made a lexical decision response, but since they could not perform the yes/no version, they only made a lexical decision response to each real word.
On the view that semantic memory is organised in a hierarchical structure and that brain damage first disrupts lower levels of the hierarchy (semantic property features; Warrington, 1975; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) , we would 9 All three progressive aphasic patients were initially referred to Dr. John Hodges, who kindly allowed us to test them.
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expect a pattern of priming in which superordinates and co-ordinates prime even when properties do not. On such an account, semantically impaired patients should show reduced priming for perceptual and functional targets in the presence of consistent priming for superordinates and category co-ordinates. In contrast, our claims for the robustness of functional information predict that this will be preserved, even when other types of semantic information are lost or become difficult to access. The patients' priming was compared to that of a group of six age-matched control subjects, each of whom was tested on all four versions of the materials, separated by an interval of 3-4 weeks.
Control Data. Mean lexical decision latencies for the controls are shown in Fig. 2 . They show a significant overall priming effect of 50msec [F1(1,15) = 40.45, P < .01; F2(1,168) = 138.21, P < .01]. For the four types of semantic relation, the mean priming effects ranged from 37msec (perceptual relations) to 69msec (category co-ordinates). These differences did not produce a robust semantic relation × prim ing interaction [Min F¢ (3,127) = 2.36, P = .074; F1(3,15) = 8.95, P < .05; F2(3,168) = 3.21, P < .05]. We analysed each type of semantic relation separately and found a significant effect of priming and no interactions between amount of priming and the living/non-living variable. For the superordinates, the mean RT for related items was 677msec and for unrelated items it was 716msec [F1(1,5) = 11.9, P < . .05]; living/nonliving × prim ing [F1(1,5) = 7.0, P < .05; F2(1,40) = 1.9, P = 0.17]. For items in the functional condition, the mean RT for related items was 730msec, and for unrelated items it was 787msec [F1(1,5) = 31.2, P < .01; F2(1,40) = 32.7, P < .01]; living/non-living × priming (F1 and F2 < 1). The co-ordinates had a mean related RT of 708msec and a mean unrelated RT of 777msec [F1(1,5) = 386.7, P < .01; F2(1,40) = 63.2, P < .01]; living/non-living × priming (F1 and F2 < 1) . Finally, in the perceptual condition, the mean RT for related items was 742msec, and for unrelated pairs it was 779msec [F1(1,5) = 17.9, P < . 01, F2(1,40) = 20.6, P < .01]; living/non-living × priming (F1 and F2 < 1).
We also obtained an estimate of the magnitude of priming effects in the various conditions, against which to compare the patients' performance. The mean proportion of priming ([control-test RT/control RT] × 100 ) was 5% in both the perceptual and superordinate conditions (respective ranges: 2-13%, 1-11%), 9% in the coordinate condition (range: 7-11%), and 7% in the functional condition (range: 3-11%).
AM
As part of our longitudinal investigation of AM's language impairment, carried out in collaboration with John Hodges and Karalyn Patterson, we tested him on this experiment on three occasions; April 1994, March 1995, and October 1995. At each time-slice, AM was tested on all four versions of the experiment with at least 1 week separating testing sessions. In April 1994, his mean RT was 933msec, only slightly slower than that of the normal controls (range: 598-827msec) and he made 8%LD errors (control range: 0-8%), most of which were false positives 10 . When next tested in March 1995, his mean LD RT was slightly slower (1086msec) and his error rate had increased to 14%. Six months later, in October 1995, his mean RT was 990msec and he had an overall error rate of 19%. Over the 18-month testing period AM's pattern of priming changed systematically. He initially showed priming only for functional [F(1,38) = 5.706, P = .02] and visual [F(1,34) = 5.3, P = .028] properties; neither superordinate 10 Over the testing period, AM produced increasing numbers of false positive responses in the LD task. They increased from 6% in April '94 to 14% in October '95. We assume that the LD response reflects a combination of the automatic activation of semantic information and response decision criteria. We believe that it is these latter that have changed for AM, and that the automatic activation of semantic information remains essentially unimpaired. This is consistent with the increasing number of false positive errors AM made over the same time period on other tasks involving judgements (e.g. semantic relatedness judgements). Thus, we do not attribute the increase in false positive errors to problems with the lexical decision task per se, but assume it reflects general changes in response bias.
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[F(1,40) < 1] nor category relations [F(1,37) < 1] primed. This shows that although both functional and perceptual properties were significantly and equally primed, there was no evidence of facilitation for either category or superordinate information. Since AM's mean LD was slightly slower than that of the controls, we also calculated proportion of priming (control-test RT/mean RT; Chertkow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989) . Perceptual properties produced a priming effect of 11%, which was within the normal range, as was the 9% priming for functional attributes. However, the proportion of priming for both category (4%) and superordinate (-1%) relations was outside the normal range. Table 4 shows the proportion of priming for each type of semantic relation at all three time-slices.
When next tested, in March 1995, AM only showed significant priming for functional relations [F(1,32) = 4.44, P < .05]. Now, visual properties (F < 1) joined the superordinate [F(1,38) = 3.16, P > .05] and category relations (F < 1) in showing no significant priming (see Table 4 ). Finally, in October 1995, he showed no priming for any type of semantic relation (all Fs < 1; see Table  4 ). Once again, there was no effect of the living/non-living distinction; no living vs non-living interaction ever approached significance. This is not the pattern that would have been predicted on the hierarchical account, which claims that brain damage affects lower-level properties, leaving category structure relatively preserved (see also Moss, Tyler, & Kopelman, in preparation) . Such a model predicts the opposite pattern to the one we obtained; preserved priming of superordinates and co-ordinates and progressively reduced priming of functional and perceptual properties.
AM's pattern of priming shows that, over time, less semantic information becomes activated but functional information remains accessible until the last, providing further evidence for the robustness of functional information in the face of brain damage. Interestingly, at the point in time when AM started to show no priming for functional information, he was also beginning to have difficulty using common objects (e.g. eating implements) appropriately. 
TABLE 4 AM: Proportion of Priming Over Time
Condition ------------------------------
TYLER AND MOSS
SC
SC was tested on the auditory lexical decision version of the priming study over a 2-month period in March-April 1994. She only showed significant priming of functional and category co-ordinate relations. In the functional condition, related RTs (948msec) were significantly faster than unrelated RTs [1023msec; F(1,38) = 7.8, P < .01], with no difference in the amount of priming for the living (94msec) and non-living things (58msec; F < 1). Category co-ordinates also primed robustly [mean related RT = 877msec; mean un related = 1008msec; F(1,38) = 17.9, P < .01] by 131msec. Once again, living (120msec) and non-living things (142msec) primed by similar amounts. In contrast, superordinates did not significantly prime [mean related RT = 890msec; mean unrelated RT = 918msec; F(1,39) = 1.9, P = .18], nor did perceptual properties (mean related RT = 946msec; mean unrelated RT = 982msec; F < 1).
Summary
These priming studies with language-impaired patients all show the relative preservation of functional information, even when other aspects of semantic representations have become impaired. We see this most clearly with AM, who we were able to test longitudinally. As his understanding of the meaning of words gradually deteriorates, the functional properties of concepts remain accessible well after other aspects of meaning are no longer available.
DIFFERENT TYPES OF FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION
The studies described in the first two sections of this paper support the hypothesis prompting this research-that functional information is a salient aspect of the semantic representations of both living and non-living things-by showing that functional information is primed robustly and is relatively resilient to the effects of brain damage.
In this final section of the paper, we discuss the nature of functional properties in the semantic representations of living and non-living things. In the Introduction we made the point that the definition of what constitutes the functional properties of living things depends upon the perspective one brings to the study of the structure of categories. Developmentalists, for example, focus on the biological functions of living things, such as breathing, moving, and eating, whereas cognitive neuropsychologists have usually defined the functional attributes of living things more loosely, including such information as where things live, what they eat, and their conventional attributes (e.g. that lions are brave or that elephants never forget). These properties are often referred to as functional-associative or encyclopaedic. These different definitions have consequences for the role that functional information plays in theories of the semantic representations of living things. Theories about the acquisition of concepts stress the importance of the functional properties of living things; learning that animate objects move themselves, for example, is something that the child acquires very early in life and forms the basis for further distinctions between living and non-living things. This is the kind of functional information that is discussed in the developmental literature as being amongst the earliest acquired knowledge distinguishing living from non-living things (Mandler, 1992) , and forming the basis of children's developing theories about living things. Carey (1985) and Keil (1989) have argued that children's understanding of what constitutes a living thing is based upon biological theories that they start to develop at an early age. An integral part of these theories is not just perceptual information-such as the fact that animals have ears, eyes, and skin-but also biological functions.
The central role of the functional properties of living things in developmental theories stands in sharp contrast to its peripheral role in theories of category structure assumed by cognitive neuropsychologists. Knowing that a tiger lives in India is, in some sense, tangential to understanding what a tiger is. However, knowing that a tiger breathes is central to understanding what kind of thing a tiger is. Thus, when cognitive neuropsychologists probe for functional knowledge of living things in patients with semantic deficits, they are probing for rather peripheral aspects of meaning. This may be why it is often reported that such patients have lost their knowledge of the functional attributes of living things (Laws et al., 1995; Sartori et al., 1993) .
To evaluate properly the claim that deficits for particular categories of knowledge are due to loss of different types of featural information, we need to compare like with like; we have to find functional attributes of living and non-living things that are, in some basic sense, equivalent to each other and equally salient in their respective representations. Thus, we need to compare the biological function of living things with the functional properties of nonliving things. In doing so, we also take into account another important aspect of the structure of categories-the relationship between form and function. For non-living things, function is highly related to form; the use to which an object is put is related to its physical structure (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994) . The parallel for living things is in the form-function relationship between biological function and parts of the body; eyes are for seeing, ears are for hearing, limbs are for moving. However, form-function relationships for living things go beyond what can be seen and include what can be inferred on the basis of our theories about what constitutes a living thing, such as the fact that animals breathe and thus must have lungs. These biological form-function relations are central to the meaning of living things in the way that non-biological formfunction relations are especially salient to the meaning of non-living things (Wierzbieka, 1985) .
It has been claimed that the attributes of living things are highly intercorrelated compared to those of non-living things (Keil, 1989; McRae, deSa, & Seidenberg, 1997) . Recently, Gonnerman et al., (in press) have argued that this will have the effect of making living things resistant to the effects of generalised brain damage. Assuming a distributed model where semantic representations consist of activated micro-features, they argue that because the attributes of living things are highly intercorrelated, damage to some of the attributes will be compensated for by the remaining features. Thus, knowledge of living things will only be impaired more than knowledge of non-living things when generalised brain damage is severe.
We believe that intercorrelations alone are not sufficient to account for the structure of concepts, and that we need to invoke an additional factor-that of form-function relations , where the function of an object, such as a cup, is dependent upon its form. Form-function relations have been invoked to account for the preservation of artefact knowledge (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994) ; we believe that they should be extended to living things in the following way. The biological functions of living things are tightly related to their form; for example, eyes-see, ears-hear, lungs-breathe. We suggest that it is this type of form-function relation that is part of the intercorrelated structure of concepts of living things, and predictthat brain damageshould have less effect upon the biological functional properties of living things (e.g. cow-breathe) than upon their non-biological functional properties (e.g. cow-farm).
We recently had the opportunity to test this hypothesis with a patient (RC) who contracted herpes encephalitis in January 1992. RC was referred to us in November 1994 as having a category-specific deficit for living things. As part of our investigation into this deficit, we obtained data from three types of task: picture naming, definitions, and property verification. The nature of his errors on picture naming and definitions confirmed that he had a severe deficit for knowledge of living things. The property verification studies explored the relationship between his biological and non-biological functional knowledge for living things.
Patient RC
RC was born in 1960 and worked as an unqualified social worker before the onset of herpes. He now has severe memory problems, is easily distracted, and has a short attention span. Other than word-finding problems, he appears to produce and understand language without obvious difficulty. An MRI scan, carried out in June 1992 showed extensive high signal in the temporal lobes, more marked on the left than on the right 11 . To confirm the diagnosis of a 11 We thank Dr. Richard Greenwood of Homerton Hospital, London, for referring this patient to us and for providing us with scan information.
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category-specific impairment for living things, we tested RC on a category comprehension test (Hodges et al., 1992) where he had to chose the correct picture out of an array of six pictures 12 . These sets were matched for familiarity. Controls find this task very easy, and make almost no errors. RC was more impaired than the controls, and he showed a substantial advantage for nonliving things (75% correct) compared to living things (17% correct).
Naming Pictures and Defining Spoken Words
We asked RC to name all of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) pictures. He correctly named only 17% of the living things and 49% of the non-living things. Because the living/non-living distinction is confounded with familiarity in the Snodgrass set, we selected 22 living and 24 non-living items, matched for familiarity, in order to conduct quantitative and qualitative analyses of RC's naming responses. Table 5 presents the familiarity details for the materials. In addition, we asked RC to define the spoken words corresponding to these 46 items.
RC showed the same general pattern for the familiarity-matched set as for the full set, although the difference between living and non-living things was more marked; he could not name any of the animals or fruit and vegetables correctly, but managed to name 46% of the artefacts 13 . Complementing the quantitative analysis, we also carried out a detailed qualitative analysis of RC's naming errors for the 46 items in the familiarity-matched subset. We scored the MRC ratings on scale 1-7; Snodgrass ratings 1-5. 12 We thank John Hodges for making this test available to us. 13 We have recently developed a new set of colour photographs in order to study categoryspecific deficits (Bunn, Tyler, & Moss, 1996) . We have a total of 227 items in 13 categories. Items in the living things categories of animals, insects, fruits, and vegetables are matched (on an item-by-item basis where possible) with categories of non-living things (vehicles, toys, tools, and clothes) on word and object familiarity, naming congruency, word length, and visual complexity. We also have items in the additional categories of birds, food, body parts, furniture, and musical instruments. When RC was asked to name all of the items from this well-matched set, he made 90% errors on the matched sets of living things and 51% errors on the corresponding categories of non-living things naming errors according to whether his response included (1) a superordinate label, (2) a functional property (e.g. to eat for pineapple), (3) a perceptual property (e.g. long legs for ostrich), (4) a within-category member of the target picture (e.g. hawkin response to the picture of an eagle), and (5) a "don't know" response. RC occasionally failed to recognise a picture at all but tried to work out what it was and describe it (e.g. in response to the picture of a cherry, he responded with: "bounce, hanger" and he responded to the picture of a drum with "a box, to put ware in or pieces of rubbish in"). Table 6 shows the breakdown of his naming responses according to each type of error. Table 6 shows that, although RC could not name any of the animals, he produced some functional information to 29% of the animal pictures. He responded to the picture of a seal as "possibly an underwater" and to a mouse with "live on the ground." He produced a similar amount of perceptual information, saying "four-legs, two ears" to the picture of a rabbit, and "long tail, short ears" to a fox. However, he never produced any perceptual information that was not visible in the picture, suggesting that he was describing the picture, rather than knowing what the animal was. As with the pictures of animals, RC never produced the correct name for pictures of fruits and vegetables. However, he more frequently produced functional (e.g. onion: "food, cook") than perceptual information (e.g. strawberry; "food, red"). RC was able to give the correct name (or a close synonym-e.g. shirt for blouse) for almost half of the pictures of artefacts, and rarely produced a superordinate. He also produced much more functional than perceptual information.
These analyses show that RC produces functional information for living as well as non-living things, without the expected pattern of more perceptual than functional information for living things, especially for animals. The perceptual 
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information that he does produce seems to be read off the picture rather than being an internal representation. RC's definitions for the same items (see Table 7 ) show a similar pattern to the naming data, although the pattern is more exaggerated in certain respects. The naming and definition data confirm that RC has a severe semantic impairment, which affects living more than non-living things. Within the category of living things, his knowledge of animals is particularly impaired. A notable aspect of RC's naming and definition data is that he sometimes verbalised the biological functions of aspects of living things. For example, he named a picture of a mouth as "get together smile" and in response to a picture of a seahorse he said "a see-through and a tail and a mouth . . . a miouw woof-woof." We infer that the "miouw woof-woof" referred to the function of mouths (to produce sounds) for some of the animals he still knows (dogs and cats). Unimpaired subjects never do this. Biological functions are such an integral part of animal concepts that they do not need to be articulated.
The severity of RC's semantic impairment provided an opportunity to evaluate the hypothesis that the biological functions of living things will be spared relative to non-biological functions. To probe RC's knowledge of different types of functional information, we carried out two property verification tasks. In one, we probed for knowledge of functional and perceptual attributes of living and non-living things. The functional attributes of living things were non-biological and were true of many, although not all, members of a category. In a second, we probed for biological functions of living things.
Property Verification Studies
One property verification test used materials from Experiment 1, consisting of 24 living and 24 non-living prime-target pairs where the target was either a visual or functional property of the prime (crocodile-green; crocodile-river). The functional properties of living things were non-biological, and were true of a number of members of the category, for example: live in rivers, are pets, and live on farms. Similarly, the functional properties of non-living things were also applicable to many members of a category: used for hitting, keep you warm, for sitting on.
We constructed short sentences out of each prime-property pair; crocodile-green became crocodiles are green, and house-window became houses have windows. Pairing each prime with its two properties produced 96 true statements, and an equal number of false statements were then constructed by pseudorandomly re-pairing primes with other targets; for example, helicopters was paired with live in rivers, the non-visual property from alligators, to produce the false statement helicopters live in rivers. We added filler items to the set of true and false properties and the total set of items was pseudorandomly ordered. Each statement was read aloud to subjects, who indicated whether the statement was true or false.
The data for the control subjects and RC are given in Turning to the second verification study, in which we probe for knowledge of the biological functions of living things, once again we had four categories (with between 19 and 22 items/category); living/non-living and perceptual vs. functional properties. This time, the functional properties of living things were biological functions (e.g. fox-move; mouse-breathe). Properties were selected from a property generation pre-test 15 . False trials were created by re-pairing each property with another item. For all conditions each property appeared in one true and one false trial, counterbalanced over two versions of the materials.
14 These were elderly control subjects, aged between 65 and 75 years. We would expect younger subjects to make even fewer errors. 15 We balanced the mean familiarity of the items within the living and non-living sets, just as we had done for the first property generation test. Mean familiarity for the living perceptual = 4.9, living functional = 5.1, non-living perceptual = 5.4, non-living functional = 5.3.
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Nine control subjects were very accurate in this task, making 1-5% errors. Their results, and those of RC, are given in Table 8 . RC's overall error rate was comparable in the two studies and he was more error prone on living (31% errors) compared to non-living (15% errors) things. The main difference between the two studies lies in RC's accuracy on questions about the functional properties of living things. He was more accurate at verifying the biological functions of living things (A¢ = .91) than their non-biological functions (A¢ = .81) in the previous study. This difference was not statistically significant (c 2 = 1.09, n.s.); however, we obtained the same pattern in a subsequent property verification study probing RC's knowledge of the biological and non-biological functions of living things. In this study, we had 4 categories (biological true/false; non-biological true/false) with 14 items in each. RC was 93%correct on the items that probed biological knowledge and only 75% correct for non-biological questions.
RC's data on the property verification tasks suggests that his knowledge of the biological functions of living things is relatively more preserved than that of non-biological functions, supporting the claim we are making for the salience of biological functions in the semantic representations of living things. This point is underscored by the highly unusual aspects of his speech output, when he explicitly refers to biological functions, such as "hearing aid" for ears and "see-through" for eyes. 
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CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to explore the processing implications of the hypothesis that functional information has particular salience in semantic representations. Our first line of evidence came from priming studies with normal subjects, where we found priming for functional attributes to be just as robust as for category co-ordinates. The similarity between functional and category priming is particularly compelling in view of the semantic overlap between category co-ordinates. Assuming a featural basis for semantic representations, members of the same category typically share many features and thus are deemed to be strongly related. Prime-target pairs in which the target is a functional property of the prime, in contrast, share very few features. The fact that they prime so rapidly and robustly suggest that these features are quickly and strongly activated. An important aspect of this study is that the amount of priming did not vary as a function of the living/non-living variable; both the functional and the perceptual attributes of living and non-living things primed equally strongly. This was particularly noteworthy in the case of living things, where it has frequently been claimed that perceptual attributes are salient in the representation and functional properties are marginal. The priming data argue against this view. In a second study we probed the time-course of activation of functional and perceptual attributes of artefact concepts, and found that functional information was activated early in the processing of a word whereas perceptual information became available more slowly. Differential activation rates associated with different types of information are consistent with the claim that the information that is activated most rapidly is that which is most salient in the semantic representation.
Our second line of evidence came from language-impaired patients who showed priming for the functional features of both living and non-living things even when priming for other types of semantic relation was either diminished or absent. AM presented the most striking case study; his semantic knowledge became increasingly impaired over time, but the functional properties of concepts remained accessible the longest. This is additional evidence that the ability to access functional information is relatively resistant to brain damage. However, the relative preservation of biological functional has limited usefulness in maintaining knowledge of individual living things since it is general information (e.g. move, breathe, eat, etc.) that is true of all members of a category but does not distinguish between them. Thus, patients should be able to categorise living things quite accurately but should have difficulty in identifying them uniquely.
How do we account for the relative preservation of functional information? We believe, along with others (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994) , that form-function intercorrelations play an important part in the structure of concepts. De Renzi and Lucchelli have argued that the distinction between living and non-living things is not so much in the proportion of different kinds of features but in their relationship to each other. For non-living things there is an important relationship between form and function, with the function of an object frequently placing strong constraints on its form. For example, the function of a knife is to cut things and this determines its form, i.e. having a blade and a handle. These form-function relations can be captured as correlations between semantic features in a distributed network. The activation of the function features will support activation of the form features, and vice versa. We have argued in this paper that similar form-function relations exist for a specific type of function for living things, namely biological function. Just as for the form-function relations existing for artefacts, the form-biological function relations of living things will mutually support each other, increasing the probability that this type of information will be relatively resistant to brain damage. The data from the herpes encephalitis patient, RC, support this proposal. More generally, we predict that for all concepts, it will be information represented in the form-function relations that will be relatively robust in the face of brain damagecompared to functional information that is not part of form-function relations. We are currently investigating these predictions by means of connectionist modelling (Durrant-Peatfield, Tyler, Moss, & Levy, 1997; Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, Levy, Voice, & Moss, 1996) and further studies with patients. 
